The United States, Russia, and China are intensifying their competition for global influence. Our analysis reveals that their involvement and impact vary across the Middle East and North Africa. Within subregions, the three powers assert their influence in the realms of economy, security, and diplomacy, achieving various degrees of success.
In this project, we examine the ways that the three great powers bilaterally engage with Arab League countries, Iran, Israel, and Türkiye in the time between 2012 and 2022. We offer our data in two distinct ways.
Firstly, based on geographical proximity, shared histories and characteristics, or trends exhibited, we group some countries into subregions. Iran and Türkiye do not fit squarely into any specific subregion; therefore, we analyze them individually. For example, we group Levantine countries with Iraq and Israel into a subregion due to their geographical proximity, status as centers of enduring and interrelated conflicts, and strong American influence. In our examination of the three great powers, we identify trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), arms exports, and military deployment as four indicators to show trends of engagement with each subregion in the Middle East and North Africa.
Secondly, we offer our data on a country-by-country basis. We provide sets of data from many aspects of engagement, from diplomatic engagement to public opinion polls. These datasets are easily accessible and downloadable for each country. We hope that fellow researchers working on the great power competition in the Middle East and North Africa will find them useful to develop and identify trends considering country specific expertise.
Although we would like to produce a set of parameters that immediately determine which great power leads the competition in the Middle East and North Africa today, we fear that no set of quantitative data could truly capture the nuanced nature of influence in a region as complex and multi-faceted as the MENA region.
We are acutely aware that globally, American hegemony has been reinforced through a global network of military bases, widespread cultural influence through media, leadership in technological advancements, in addition to international monetary institutions that establish the U.S. dollar as the backbone of global finance. In a similar vein, the rise of China on the global scale has been a structuring feature in recent decades, in which the industrial and trade giant has advanced to become a big player in international relations, multilateral organizations, and technological and security advancements. Russia, traditionally an influential power in some parts of the Middle East and North Africa, has made a geostrategic comeback in recent years. Although Russian trade, FDI, arms exports, and military deployment have remained relatively low in the MENA region, they have shaped geostrategic and political realities in some countries such as Syria, Libya, and nowadays Sudan.
Due to this project’s scope limitations, data such as UN voting patterns, multilateral cooperation schemes, and collective security arrangements are not included. Therefore, we do not derive causal conclusions regarding the influence of the three powers in the Middle East and North Africa. Rather, we shed light on some broad trends of engagement.
Between 2012 and 2022, Arab Mashreq countries, with the exception of Jordan, faced increased violence, civil strife, political instability, and terrorist threats. The absence of peace in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories has continued to afflict both populations, and a political solution has come to appear more unattainable than ever with an ongoing war in Gaza since 2023 and increasing violence in the West Bank.
During the decade, the United States increased its economic and military ties with its allies in the Mashreq—Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon—and Israel, and developed a robust anti-terrorism operation first to defeat the self-proclaimed Islamic State and then to prevent its reemergence.
China, meanwhile, strengthened its economic relations with all countries—increase in trade with Iraq is notable in this regard—and avoided getting involved in security matters in a troubled subregion for both strategic and pragmatic reasons.
Russian military intervention in 2015, in conjunction with support from Iran and Iranian backed groups, helped save the ruling regime in Syria and put an end to the democratic aspirations of the popular uprising that began in 2011. This intervention returned Russia to the center of power politics in the subregion.
North African countries were affected by heightened security threats, stability risks, and governance deficits across the ten-year stretch from 2012 to 2022. Following popular uprisings in 2011, the fate of specific countries varied from state disintegration in Libya to short term political openings in Tunisia and Egypt, from orderly presidential succession amid political instability in Algeria to monarchical consolidation to avert popular protests in Morocco.
U.S. economic and security policies toward North African countries fluctuated between expanding trade relations and increasing FDIs in the early part of the 2012–2022 decade and decreasing them and reducing arms exports in the later part.
China, in contrast, consistently expanded its economic and diplomatic ties with North Africa as a subregion without selling more arms or developing significant military ties.
Russian economic ties with North Africa, most prominently with Egypt and Algeria, stagnated whereas its security relations experienced through two phases: a phase of expansion related to arms sales to Egypt, Algeria, and Libyan factions between 2012 and 2020 followed by a shrinking phase that emerged after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Since the war’s start, Russia has become a less reliable exporter.
This subregion exhibited upward economic and security trends with China between 2012–2022 more than the other subregions included in this analysis. China’s trade relations and foreign direct investments surpassed U.S. and Russian trade and FDIs combined. Although the United States sustained a high level of military deployment in this subregion—highlighted by the U.S. Africa Command—and conducted various anti-terrorist missions, China garnered geostrategic attention by building its first, and for now only, overseas naval base in Djibouti. Since 2017, China has also become the largest arms exporter to the Arab countries in East Africa and the Indian Ocean, surpassing Russia.
From 2012 to 2022, the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed greater stability than anywhere else in the wider region, despite civil strife in Bahrain in 2011–2012 and an ongoing civil war in Yemen since 2014. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council emerged as economic powerhouses in the Middle East and North Africa.
From a great power perspective, the United States continued to lead in economic ties. It also kept its status as the preferred great power for security guarantees, as evident from the aspirations of the Saudi Arabian government to sign a holistic security agreement with the United States. U.S. trade relations and foreign direct investments as well as arms exports and military deployment—centered around various bases in the Gulf—stayed ahead of comparable Chinese and Russian activities.
Russia expanded its economic ties with Gulf countries, but its economic prowess remained marginal. Russian arms exports slowed down after a peak in sales, especially to the UAE, between 2012 and 2013.
China, for its part, significantly increased trade relations and FDIs in the Arabian Peninsula and as a result garnered higher diplomatic recognition. A clear manifestation came when China mediated the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023. Energy trading remained fundamental to the relationship between China and the Gulf region. However, China has continued to stay away from the Arabian Peninsula militarily, realizing that it remains a bastion of American influence. Most recently, Beijing’s restrained response to the rising tensions in the Red Sea starkly illustrated China’s reluctance.
As a non-Arab country in the Middle East and North Africa with histories of conflict with its Arab neighbors, Iran has always prioritized developing strong economic and security ties with more distant players. Iran combined expanding economic and security ties with Russia and China with an approach to position and empower armed nonstate allies across the region—most prominently in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—over the period of 2012 to 2022. Iranian policies in the Middle East have been also driven by the ongoing confrontation with the United States and Israel. The result has been strong, albeit fluctuating, economic and security ties with Russia and China and minimal trade relations with the United States.
Türkiye has remained firmly an ally of the United States since it joined NATO in 1952. However, between 2012 and 2022, Turkish economic and security ties with the three great powers exhibited higher diversity than any other country in the Middle East and North Africa. U.S., Chinese, and Russian trade relations and FDIs have, taken together, expanded between 2012 and 2022. Military deployment in Türkiye remained exclusively in U.S. hands. Arms sales, following policy tensions between Ankara and Washington, became multisource. Although the United States kept the biggest share of arms sales to Türkiye from 2012 to 2022, the same period witnessed a significant uptick in Russian arms sales, especially after 2019.
