Drawing contrasts with the United States has been at the heart of Beijing’s strategy of winning hearts and minds in the Global South and increasingly among middle powers. From Beijing’s perspective, that contrast has less to do with who is more dominant, but about who is the more “responsible great power.” Recent polling from two very different sources suggests that Beijing is making some inroads. The 2026 edition of the State of Southeast Asia Survey from Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute shows China slightly exceeding the United States in favorability among the region’s elites. Meanwhile, a Politico poll finds that traditional U.S. allies are also tilting in China’s direction.  

These results likely reflect Chinese restraint as it does U.S. impulsivity in recent years. Instances of U.S. unpredictability allow China to capitalize on its positioning as a dependable defender of the status quo. Such appeals resonate in parts of the Global South where Beijing is cultivating economic and diplomatic ties. Beijing’s pitch of stability, prosperity, and equality provides inspiration to those searching for models of development and prosperity while putting histories of war and colonialism behind them. 

When it comes to U.S. allies, the shift seems to mainly rest on a judgment over whether China is more dependable under Xi Jinping or the United States is more reliable under Donald Trump. The latest conflict in Iran again bolsters China’s case that it is the responsible power rather than the erratic actor unnecessarily disrupting trade, energy, and supply chains. Such turmoil disproportionately affects Asian economies, reinforcing the view that the U.S. now has little regard for the repercussions of its actions.  

Yet expectations that China will take up the mantle that the U.S. is ceding are misplaced. When it comes to the Iran conflict, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s latest four-point proposal was largely a reiteration of Beijing’s long-held principles—peaceful coexistence, national sovereignty, international rule of law, and a balanced approach to development and security—rather than actions. The same may be said of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s joint five-point initiative put forward with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. They sought an immediate cessation of hostilities, the start of peace talks, ensuring the safety of non-military targets, the security of shipping lanes, and touted the primacy of the UN Charter.  

While China has had a flurry of diplomatic activities since the start of the Iran war—from Russia and Spain to the UAE and Vietnam—their immediate outcomes remain unclear. It is more likely that Beijing wanted to use these visits to stress that the world cannot “fall back into the law of the jungle,” reinforcing China as a defender of the international system.   

These activities paint an image of a great power mounting an independent, diplomatic response to a crisis made by America. But what China is actually willing to do in times of crisis remains limited. Beijing’s current priority appears to be mainly about accruing so-called “discourse power” rather than projecting power in ways that the United States has done for seventy-five years. There are other reasons that Beijing is not particularly interested in substituting for the United States.   

Despite being a permanent member of the United Nations and the world’s second-largest economy, some among China’s strategic class remain skeptical about assuming global leadership. Look no further than Beijing’s constant refrain against “hegemonism.” Global leadership could trap China in expensive foreign entanglements that sap resources at the expense of domestic development. Given its concerns over debt, slower growth, and demographic decline, Beijing already has its hands full.  

Beijing may believe that it is better off relying on existing institutions and mechanisms where it can, modifying them where it must, and providing alternatives where it should. China’s rise in the past decades depended in part on harnessing globalization and economic liberalization supported by the United States. There is little reason for China to overturn a system that nurtured its success.  

More proximately, ensuring that the upcoming May visit between presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is successful probably reduces Beijing’s appetite for being vocal and active on the Middle East conflict. Even when criticizing U.S. belligerence toward Iran and the resulting global disruptions, Chinese leaders generally refrained from calling out the United States and President Trump explicitly. 

Structurally, China has mostly eschewed alliances since the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1960s and has no formal security commitments with its partners and quasi-allies except North Korea. To expect China to behave like the United States of today in the global arena seems to rest on a faulty premise.  

It is worth recalling that the United States did not enthusiastically embrace global leadership even when it became the world’s largest economy in the late nineteenth century. It was happy to free ride on the British Royal Navy’s provision of open maritime access and the classic gold standard until they failed in the first decades of the twentieth century. The United States stepped into global leadership not because it necessarily wanted to but because it felt it had to after World War II. 

Herein lies the conundrum: China’s behavior seems to resemble the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, but perceptually, much of the world today expects more. Each time Beijing puts itself forward as the “responsible adult in the room” and global stabilizer, anticipation grows for China to fulfill what it articulates but also to go above and beyond. Being a responsible great power means doing what others are unwilling or unable to do, even at some cost and when “win-win” solutions are not apparent.

Beijing may increasingly confront something akin to the paradox of rising expectations, making the mismatch between its words and deeds more pronounced. Even if China believes it is pulling its weight globally, many may still perceive it as punching below its weight.